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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional notions of 'offshore accounts' bring to mind
images of large sums of money gained through illegitimate means
and purposefully concealed from the view of United States author-
ities, or earned legitimately but shielded from otherwise applica-
ble taxes by means of its location in an offshore account. While
there may be some historical basis for this assumption, the mod-
ern offshore asset preservation trust is far removed from such
preconceived notions and much more nuanced.
Over $5 trillion dollars is invested in banks, mutual funds
and trusts located across the world's 35 international offshore
financial centers' and many law-abiding customers are increas-
ingly placing their money in what have simultaneously been
called offshore asset preservation trusts, asset protection trusts,
or self-settled trusts.2 In reality, asset preservation trusts offer
few tax advantages; 3 their primary benefit is instead derived from
the privacy they provide their beneficiaries and settlors, their flex-
ibility, and their ability to withstand the jurisdictional furor of for-
eign judgments.4
Offshore asset preservation trusts have come under attack in
recent years, however, by both U.S. legislators and courts frus-
trated in their attempts to enforce judgments in foreign jurisdic-
tions. Much of this pressure is the result of the frequent use of
asset preservation trusts in concealing and shielding assets
derived from fraudulent schemes and money laundering associ-
ated with the illegal drug trade.5 An increasing amount of pres-
sure, however, is being directed towards these trusts due to their
use in more legally ambiguous activities such as protection of
assets from foreign civil judgments.6 Attacks on asset preservation
trusts have come in the form of an increasingly broadening view of
the reach of American jurisdiction, the enactment of new legisla-
tion for the purpose of combating the money laundering, and
1. Alexandra Marks, Americans Move Piggybanks Offshore, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 9, 1997, at 2.
2. GILBERT KODILINEYE & TREVOR A. CARMICHAEL, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
TRUSTS LAW 319 (2nd ed. 2002).
3. Barry S. Engel, Integrated Estate Planning with Foreign-Situs Trusts, 31 TAX
ADVISER 102, 3 (2000).
4. Id.




international cooperation with offshore jurisdictions.7
This article will first discuss the general benefits to be derived
from the management of both legitimate and illegitimate offshore
asset preservation trusts, and whether some of the more ambigu-
ous features of such trusts lead to the conclusion that they are
fraudulent on a de facto basis. It will then address the steps the
United States has taken recently, both legislatively and judicially,
to reach the assets in these trusts, and some of the international
cooperative efforts undertaken to combat the illegitimate ways in
which people have used offshore asset preservation trusts. This
article will next focus on the myriad of responses to U.S. pressure
by various offshore Caribbean jurisdictions, with special focus on
the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. Lastly, the article will
address whether American laws have over-reached in their
attempt to combat money laundering, the sufficiency of the Carib-
bean response to American pressure, and what the drafter of an
asset preservation trust should keep in mind when forming and
managing a 'legitimate' offshore asset preservation trust.
II. THE BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHING AN OFFSHORE
ASSET PRESERVATION TRUST
It is no coincidence that the rising popularity of offshore asset
preservation trusts in recent years has paralleled the sharp rise of
litigation in the United States.' As an increasingly large segment
of the population has found themselves subject to liability by U.S.
courts, they have sought to protect themselves from potential
creditors by placing their assets beyond the reach of a court's
jurisdiction. Once reserved for the ultra-wealthy, asset preserva-
tion trusts can now be opened over the internet in order to shield
doctors from malpractice suits or insulate assets in dispute during
a divorce proceeding While both domestic and foreign asset pro-
tection trusts may be able to provide a base level of protection
against U.S. creditors, foreign trusts provide additional benefits
because of their geographical location, divergence from certain
7. See generally SHAZEEDA A. ALI, MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL IN THE
CARIBBEAN 233 (2003).
8. D. Osborne, Asset Protection for United States Clients, 4 J. OF INT'L TR. &
CORP. PLAN. 12 (1995).
9. Barry Flynn, Many Steer Clear of Offshore Opportunities: Secret "Asset-
Protection Trusts" Can be Legal or Not, But They're Risky Either Way, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, May 14, 2001, at A6.
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common law forced heirship laws, the ability for a trust to be "self-
settled," and immunity from foreign judgments.
Both the role asset preservations trusts play in avoiding for-
eign judgments and the legally tenuous means by which they
accomplish their role have lead some critics to conclude that such
trusts are fraudulent devices by their very nature. 10 Others argue,
however, that as punitive damage awards in the United States
continue to increase, people are justified in moving their assets to
offshore jurisdictions where such unreasonable awards are less
likely to be awarded, and that U.S. courts should respect the laws
and sovereignty of these foreign jurisdictions.1
A. Tax Benefits
Contrary to popular belief, harboring money in an asset pres-
ervation trust does not immunize either the settlor or the benefici-
ary of the funds from tax liability in their home country. Although
the settlor of such trusts typically does not have to pay taxes in
the offshore jurisdiction where the trust is located, the settlor is
still liable for any taxes in their home jurisdiction where the
assets were initially procured.1 2 Avoidance of taxes is therefore not
an important factor contributing to the decision of a settlor to go
offshore. 3 The benefits of such trusts have instead been charac-
terized by the degree of control they afford their settlors, their pro-
tection by strict banking confidentiality laws, and the immunity
they enjoy from foreign judgments.
B. Self-Settled Trusts
The defining characteristic of an offshore asset preservation
trust is its allowance of the settlor to retain control over both the
management of the trust and its ultimate retention.14 The very
10. See generally Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Affordable Media, L.L.C., 179 F.3d 1228,
1240 (9th Cir. 1999).
11. Marks, supra note 1.
12. G. Scott Dowling, Comment, Fatal Broadside: The Demise of Caribbean
Offshore Financial Confidentiality Post USA PATRIOT Act, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW 259,
273-274 (2004).
13. It will be discussed later, however, that the typical offshore jurisdiction will
only be willing to enforce a foreign criminal judgment if the crime for which the
defendant was convicted for in their home jurisdiction is also a crime in the
jurisdiction where the trust is located. Since offshore jurisdictions typically do not
have income taxes, they do not have laws making failure to pay income taxes a crime.
14. Mario A. Mata, Consolidating a FLP or FLLC with a Self-Settled Trust to
Enhance a Client's Wealth Preservation Strategies, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 133,
172
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idea of a self-settled trust 15 seems paradoxical to people who view
a trust as an instrument in which the settlor relinquishes control
of his assets. 6 Typically a settlor must still show caution in the
amount of control he exerts over trusts. 7 As offshore legislation
expands such power, however, a settlor increasingly has more lati-
tude to govern the disposition of his assets. For instance, under
Cayman Island trust legislation, a settlor can revoke, vary, or
amend the trust instrument; instruct a trustee regarding how the
funds should be invested; change the forum law by which the trust
is governed; and reserve for himself a beneficial interest in the
trust. s Engaging in such activities with an ordinary trust would
typically lead to the trust being considered a sham, 9 but this is
much more difficult when these powers are statutorily authorized.
As a result of such power, it can be nearly impossible for a Carib-
bean court to conclude that an asset preservation trust is a sham
which would render it vulnerable to foreign judgments. 0
C. Strict Banking Secrecy Laws
People also flock to offshore asset preservation trusts in order
to reap the benefits of their unrivaled banking secrecy laws.2
While some people may use offshore trusts in order to conceal
illicit funds from the eyes of U.S. investigators, others do it
because they fear 'Big Brother' or simply wish to keep their affairs
private.22 For instance, an offshore jurisdiction will typically not
force production of confidential information unless the debtor has
156 (2006) (explaining that the settlor of an asset preservation trust can also be its
ultimate beneficiary, a feature unique to asset preservations trusts).
15. Mario A. Mata, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Offshore Wealth
Preservation Trusts, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 775, 779 (2007) (although five U.S.
states also have trust laws which allow for this, such trusts are nevertheless
vulnerable to judgments both by their sister states and federal courts).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2) (1959).
17. See Abdel Rahman v. Chase Bank (CI) Trust Co. Ltd., [1991] J.L.R. 103
(Cayman Is.) (where widow was able to set aside a self-settled trust which avoided
forced heirship laws on the ground that the settlor's complete control over the trust
amounted to a "sham").
18. Trusts Law § 14, (2001 Rev.) (Cayman Is.).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2) (1959).
20. Ali, supra note 7, at 43.
21. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that a bank customer had
no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the protection of bank records. As a result
of Miller, United States and trust companies are now forced to comply with a court's
subpoena for private bank records. Offshore trusts, however, are free from Miller's
requirement and many Caribbean countries have therefore developed their trust
legislation in response to Miller).
22. Marks, supra note 1, at 1.
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committed a crime in their home jurisdiction which is also a crime
in the offshore jurisdiction." Because many offshore jurisdictions
also have no income or estate taxes, there are no comparable tax
crimes by which the debtor can be held liable for and therefore
forced to comply with a subpoena.24
It should be noted, however, that no jurisdictions' confidenti-
ality laws can be said to be absolute and some offshore jurisdic-
tions do divulge information in limited circumstances. In the
Bahamas, for instance, a court will grant a U.S. court order
requiring the disclosure by a bank or trust company of confiden-
tial information in some circumstances, so long as the subpoena
duces tecum is limited in scope and specific.25 In the Cayman
Islands, disclosure of confidential information is allowed when
done in accordance with any other law of the Cayman Islands. 6
Although the circumstances in which an offshore jurisdiction will
comply with a U.S. court order are still substantially limited, such
circumstances are broadening as a result of U.S. pressure to com-
bat money laundering.
D. Circumventing Forced Heirship Laws
Another benefit derived from offshore asset preservation
trusts is their avoidance of common law rules regarding forced
heirship. When the owner of a property in a U.S. jurisdiction typi-
cally wishes to convey his or her interest in a property to another,
forced heirship, marital property, and other laws may interfere
with how the owner of the property wishes it to be distributed.27
For instance, many states still enforce a rule against perpetu-
ities, 28 which restrains the long-term distribution of property. If
the property is held in an offshore asset preservation trust, how-
23. Mata, supra note 14, at 156-157.
24. Id.
25. Nissan Motor Corp. v. Adesco, [1989-1990] 1 L.R.B. 412 (Bah.).
26. Ali, supra note 7, at 51 (It should be noted, that this is a gateway allowing the
inclusion of anti-money laundering provisions as a reason for compelling the release
of confidential information. As such provisions later evolve and broaden, Cayman
Island courts may be increasingly willing to comply with U.S. court orders to release
information. For instance, in Re H, [1996] C.I.L.R. 238, a trustee was allowed to
testify in a Pennsylvania trial regarding the details of a trust without being held
liable in the Cayman Islands).
27. Mata, supra note 14, at 157.
28. See, e.g., Nash v. Scott, 966 S.W.2d 936 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998); Smith v. Smith,
744 A.2d 988 (Del. 1999) (upholding the rule against perpetuities, which requires that




ever, such laws are of no consequence. In addition to abolishing
the rule against perpetuities,29 most foreign jurisdictions have also
abolished forced heirship laws and spousal right laws.30 The flexi-
bility of offshore asset preservation trusts therefore allows the
owner of property to have more control over who ultimately
receives his property and allows a property owner to maintain this
control for longer periods of time.
E. Immunity From Foreign Judgments
Perhaps the most important feature of an offshore asset pres-
ervation trust in the eyes of a settlor is its seeming invincibility
from judgments rendered in foreign jurisdictions. This invincibil-
ity results from simple obstacles, such as the geographic distance
between the United States and these foreign jurisdictions, as well
as very complex jurisdictional issues arising from the independent
judicial systems these countries enjoy that are free to disregard
the orders of U.S. courts.
Once a judgment for damages is entered against a criminal or
civil defendant by a U.S. court, the prevailing party will typically
wish to have this judgment enforced. If the assets are in the
United States, this is a simple process in which the deciding court
simply issues a court order, which all U.S. financial institutions
are required to comply with, to turn over the assets1.3 Foreign
institutions, however, are under no obligation to comply with a
court order from the United States. Courts must therefore either
have their judgments recognized by the foreign jurisdiction, or
exert pressure on the settlor to comply with their court orders."
1. Settlor Under Pressure
When U.S. courts attempt to exert pressure on a settlor, a
number of unique issues arise. In an asset preservation trust the
settlor is typically also the beneficiary. This might lead one to
the conclusion that when the settlor owes money, withdrawing the
needed money from an asset preservation trust is well within the
29. See, e.g., Perpetuities Law, 1995 (Cayman Is.) (abolishing the rule against
perpetuities); Mata, supra Note 14, at 183 (explaining that Nevis has also abolished
the rule against perpetuities); Fraudulent Dispositions Ordinance of 1994, §6
(Anguilla) (abolishing the rule against perpetuities).
30. See, e.g., Trusts Law §§ 90 to 92 (2002 Rev.) (Caymanian law specifically
excluding claims of forced heirship from foreign jurisdictions).
31. See, e.g., In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002).
32. Ali, supra note 7, at 239-240.
33. Mata, supra note 14, at 156-157.
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purpose for which the trust was created. 4 The primary purpose of
an asset preservation trust, however, is to protect against foreign
judgments. 5 Because withdrawing money in order to pay off a for-
eign judgment runs afoul of the main purpose for such trusts, for-
eign financial institutions have typically argued that actions by
the settlor in furtherance of this goal should not be complied with,
and Caribbean courts have agreed. For instance, the Cayman
Islands have refused to recognize a receiver of an offshore trust
appointed by a U.S. court,36 and have likewise refused to recognize
consent forms signed in compliance with an order of a foreign
court.37
Several additional features unique to offshore asset preserva-
tion trusts also help to alleviate pressure on the settlor that fol-
lows a judgment of liability in a U.S. court. First, their usual
inclusion of a 'flee clause' permits the settlor to change the situs5
of the trust to a more favorable jurisdiction if it seems that the
trust may come under legal attack. 9 Therefore, while a settlor
may initially maintain a trust in a jurisdiction which affords pref-
erential treatment in the management of the trust, if litigation is
imminent, the settlor can change the situs of a trust to an alter-
nate jurisdiction which will minimize a creditor's ability to enforce
a judgment against the trust.40 By including a 'flee clause' in an
offshore asset preservation trust, not only are creditors discour-
aged from bringing suit, but if they are prepared to bring suit they
may initially over-commit resources in a jurisdiction which will
ultimately not litigate the issue.
Most often, however, the decision to move the situs of a trust
pursuant to a 'flee clause' is not made by the trustee, but is
34. If the settlor of an asset preservation trust needs money, then so does the
beneficiary, and payment of a debt would seem to be a reasonable goal of establishing
such a trust.
35. Ali, supra note 7, at 40.
36. Stutts v. Premier Capital Trust [1992-1993] C.I.L.R. 605 (Cayman Is.)
(refusing to recognize a receiver appointed by an American court on the grounds that
it would be a recognition of the authority of foreign penal laws).
37. In Matter of ABC Ltd., [1984] C.I.L.R. 130 (Cayman Is.) (arguing that a
consent form signed in compliance with the demand of a foreign court is not true
consent at all because the signor is under duress and may be subject to civil or
criminal penalties if he does not sign the form).
38. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1421 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004) (defining
the 'situs' of the trust as the jurisdiction in which the trust is located for deciding
what procedural and substantive law should apply).
39. See, e.g. The Trustee Act of 1975 (Berm.), available at httpJ/www.commoulii.
org/bm/legislconsolact/ta1975122/
40. Ali, supra note 7, at 41-42.
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instead made by the 'protector'41 of the trust, another benefit
unique to offshore asset preservation trusts. If a protector feels
that the trustee is acting under the duress of a foreign jurisdic-
tion, it is typically within his authority to remove the trustee;
invoke a 'flee clause' in order to move the trust to another situs;
and freeze benefits payable to beneficiaries. These illustrations
make it clear that attempts by a U.S. court to exert pressure of a
settlor in order to seize assets are typically met by a number of
unique obstacles if the funds are located in an offshore asset pres-
ervation trust.
2. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
If exerting pressure on a settlor/beneficiary in the United
States is unsuccessful, an American court will typically seek to
have its judgment enforced in the jurisdiction where the assets
are located. In order for a court's judgment to be enforced, how-
ever, it must first be recognized. In the United States, a court
will typically recognize the judgment of a foreign court as a matter
of comity," so long as the foreign court is able to impartially
administer justice. 5 This does not mean, however, that foreign
jurisdictions will reciprocate this comity in recognizing the judg-
ments of U.S. courts. When foreign countries do not automatically
recognize the judgment of a U.S. court as a matter of comity, such
countries may also enter into both bilateral and multilateral trea-
ties with the United States in order to have their judgments
enforced. 6 As this article will discuss, U.S. pressure has compelled
various Caribbean jurisdictions to enter into such agreements to
enforce foreign judgments, but only in limited circumstances. In
other circumstances, Caribbean courts still fail to recognize the
judgments of American Courts and creditors are typically
required to argue the case anew in a foreign jurisdiction.
41. BLACi's LAW DICTIONARY 1260 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004) (defining
the protector as an individual, typically a lawyer in the offshore jurisdiction, who is
granted certain well-defined veto powers over the proposed actions of a trustee but is
not either the trustee or beneficiary of the trust).
42. Mata, supra note 14, at 161.
43. Ali, supra note 7, at 239-240.
44. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (defining 'comity' as the "recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of
its laws").
45. Id. at 202-203.
46. All, supra note 7, at 256.
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3. Problems Associated with Trying a Case Anew in the
Caribbean
Trying the case anew, however, poses additional problems for
a creditor. The creditor must typically hire a new lawyer to try the
case in the jurisdiction where the assets are located. To complicate
matters, many Caribbean countries prohibit lawyers from work-
ing on a contingency basis,47 which may create a financial burden
that many creditors are unable to overcome. There is also no guar-
antee that the Caribbean court will rule in the creditor's favor,48 or
that the judgment will be for the same amount. Furthermore,
many offshore jurisdictions have a statute of limitations which
may bar a creditor from trying the case anew.49
F. Benefits to Caribbean Countries of Harboring Asset
Preservation Trusts
Although the benefits of an offshore asset preservation trust
for a settlor are clear, such trusts also benefit the jurisdictions in
which they are harbored. Many of the Caribbean jurisdictions
which house these trusts are still emerging economies, attempting
to shift from systems based on agriculture to economies based on
tourism and financial services.5" In accomplishing this transfor-
mation, the subtle nuances of their trust legislation can some-
times be a double-edged sword, simultaneously attracting foreign
investors with their lax regulations and jurisdictional indepen-
dence, and frustrating foreign governments because of their fail-
ure to cooperate with judgments aimed at assets harbored abroad.
Foreign governments such as the United States, however, are not
without their means of persuasion, and it has been the task of
Caribbean governments to strike a proper balance regarding their
trust legislation.
47. See, e.g., Resorts Intern., Inc. v. Spinola, 705 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (stating the Bahamas do not allow lawyers to provide services on a
contingency fee basis); Stacey K. Lee, Piercing Offshore Asset Protection Trusts in the
Cayman Islands: The Creditors' View, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 463, 496 (1998) (the
Cayman Islands are not allowed to provide legal services on a contingency
agreement).
48. As we will see later, many Caribbean jurisdictions have different standards by
which they evaluate fraudulent dispositions and tax violations.
49. See, e.g., Fraudulent Disposition Act of 1991 § 4 (Bah.), available at http:l!
privatetrustco.com/public/FDA.PDF.
50. Ali, supra note 7, at 52 (noting that Caribbean economies have benefited from
the influx of revenue generated from licensing fees and increased capital inflows).
178
THUNDER IN PARADISE
III. THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM
OF MONEY LAUNDERING
The ability of offshore asset preservation trusts to withstand
the enforcement of foreign judgments has led to their increasing
popularity for both legally ambiguous uses such as shielding
assets from divorce proceedings and the avoidance of what might
be considered excessive punitive damages awards,5' to outright
illegal uses such as the laundering of money associated with the
illegal drug trade. The United States has therefore sought to lift
the veil of secrecy surrounding offshore asset preservation trusts
and attack the protections these trusts provide their settlors. The
United States first took aim at the problem of money laundering.
Money laundering was not even addressed as a problem in the
United States until 1970"s and was not made a crime until 1986
when Congress enacted the Money Laundering Control Act. 4 The
Money Laundering Control Act made it a crime to launder the pro-
ceeds of criminal activity by engaging in financial transactions,
with either the intent to promote that criminal activity, to conceal
the origins of the profit, or avoid reporting requirements on the
money.," Although early anti-money laundering legislation was
drafted with the problem of illicit drug trafficking in mind, the
scope of what courts are willing to consider "financial transac-
tions" for purposes of identifying money laundering has expanded
in recent years to include other transgressions as well.5 As finan-
cial institutions have come under increasing pressure to divulge
information regarding the origins of money suspected to be gained
through illegal activities, money laundering has moved offshore
where such laws are not applicable.
A. The Jurisdictional Reach of U.S. Anti-Money
Laundering Laws
The attempts of U.S. investigators to pursue money launder-
ers offshore have been met with a number of obstacles, however,
that have required both bold new legislation and judicial ingenu-
51. Flynn, supra note 9.
52. Id.
53. Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5332 (2001) (requiring that financial
institutions report certain transactions which have a high degree of usefulness in
criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations).
54. Money Laundering Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006).
55. Id.
56. Dowling, supra note 12, at 281.
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ity to overcome. The most obvious problem facing investigators is
jurisdictional in nature. How can a U.S. court enforce a judgment,
subpoena, or court order against a person or financial institution
located in another sovereign country? As mentioned earlier, in
order to enforce a judgment, a court must either compel the settlor
or financial institution to voluntarily comply with the court order,
or persuade the Caribbean jurisdiction to recognize the judgment
of the U.S. court. 7
Where either the settlor or the financial institution managing
the trust has a presence in the United States, courts have often
relied on exerting pressure. While the protections afforded to the
settlor of an asset preservation trust have been discussed, these
protections do not necessarily extend to the financial institutions
which act as trustees. For instance, many courts will hold the U.S.
subsidiary of a financial institution" liable for the refusal of their
branch in a foreign jurisdiction to comply with a court order.59 The
financial institution is therefore faced with the unappealing
dilemma of either complying with a U.S. court order regarding the
disposition of a foreign trust, or violating the trust laws of where
the trust is located. If the financial institution has a significant
presence in the United States then the scales may tip in favor of
complying with a U.S. court order because the financial institu-
tion may have more to lose.
But what happens when there is no domestic branch of a
financial institution to hold responsible and the structure of an
asset preservation trusts nullifies any pressure a court can exert
over a settlor? The U.S. court must then seek to have its judgment
enforced by a Caribbean court. As mentioned earlier, however, in
order for a court's judgment to be enforced, it must first be recog-
nized. Because most Caribbean jurisdictions do not recognize U.S.
judgments as a matter of comity, enforcement of U.S. judgments
takes place under a patchwork of treaties that provide incomplete
coverage.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 827 (11th Cir.
1984) (explaining that while the court exerted pressure on the settlor here in order to
comply with a court order, this can also lead to a recognition of prescriptive
jurisdiction in certain instances).
58. M. Hopson, Applicability of United States Anti-Money Laundering Statutes to
Foreign Banks, 8 J. INT'L BAnc1No L. 310 (1996).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(d)(2) (2006) (holding "persons" in the United States





It should also be noted that U.S. courts have engaged in an
extraterritorial"° expansion of prescriptive and enforcement juris-
diction as well. 1 American courts have claimed the right to extra-
territoriality when either a significant part of the illegal conduct
in question takes place in the United States or the illegal activity
takes place outside U.S. borders but has consequences within the
United States.2 In the first instance, varying U.S. courts have
taken differing stances regarding just how much "conduct" has to
take place within the United States in order to subject a foreign
person or entity to the laws of the U.S.. For instance, Judge
Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, has held that prescriptive
jurisdiction can be based on the "perpetration of fraudulent acts
themselves but does not extend to mere preparatory activities or
the failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activ-
ity was performed in foreign countries." 3 In other words, Friendly
takes a somewhat limited view regarding the amount of conduct
that might expose a foreign entity to U.S. jurisdiction.
Other scholars, however, now express concern that the United
States has embarked on a bold expansion of extraterritoriality
and can now assert prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction
against a financial institution anywhere in the world simply
because the institution has executed trades in U.S. currency
which have to be booked in corresponding U.S. banks.' Most
banks around the world trade to some extent in U.S. currency,
however, and such a rule would bring many transactions under
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts which would otherwise be
excluded.6 5 Such an interpretation of "conduct" is therefore dan-
gerously broad in its assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
runs the danger of infringing upon the sovereignty of other
nations. Nevertheless, Courts are beginning to expand their rule
60. The Case of S.S "Lotus" (France v. Turkey) P.C.I.J. Reports Ser, A, No. 10
(1927) (defining extraterritoriality as the exertion of jurisdiction outside the territory
of a state and is considered allowable only by virtue of some permissive rule derived
from international custom).
61. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation v. Rio Algon Ltd., 480 F. Supp.
1138, 1144 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (defining prescriptive jurisdiction as the ability of a state
to make a rule of law under international law; and enforcement jurisdiction as the
ability of a state to enforce a rule of law under international law).
62. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991).
63. I.T.T. v. Vencap, L.T.D., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975).
64. Ali, supra note 7, at 237, (citing R. BOSWORTH-DAvIES, THE IMPACT OF
INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION (1997)).
65. Id.
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of what sort of conduct is enough to bring financial activities
under the purview of U.S. courts and this trend is expected to
continue.66
U.S. courts have also been willing to exert prescriptive juris-
diction over foreign entities even when their illegal conduct takes
place outside of the United States, so long as the conduct creates a
substantial adverse effect in the United States. 7 Under this doc-
trine, a company does not even need to have a presence in the
United States or engage in conduct within U.S. borders to fall
under U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction.68 While the "substantial
effect" test is indeed an effective way of targeting the perpetrators
of fraudulent international investment schemes aimed at U.S.
investors, it also raises questions of the limits of U.S. laws and the
dangers of asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction.
When the "conduct" and "substantial effect" tests are taken in
conjunction with the pressure the United States already exerts on
settlors and financial institutions, the U.S. approach to money
laundering evinces a broad assertion of extraterritoriality. The
PATRIOT Act, however, has even further broadened the reach of
U.S. jurisdiction.
2. The USA PATRIOT Act
Although prior to September 11, 2001, attempts to expand the
reporting requirements of financial institutions were met with
widespread opposition and concerns about invasion of privacy,69
the turmoil surrounding the worst terrorist attack in our nations
history allowed the PATRIOT Act to pass with sparse opposition.
Under the guise of fighting terrorism, the PATRIOT Act has sig-
66. See, e.g., United States v. Inco Bank and Trust Corp., 845 F.2d 919, 919-920
(11th Cir. 1988) (holding a Caymanian bank liable for conspiring to smuggle cash out
of the U.S., in breach of U.S. reporting laws, even though they had never entered or
performed any overt acts within the U.S.).
67. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
68. See, e.g., Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261-262
(2d Cir. 1989) (holding a foreign corporation liable under anti-trust laws for creating a
'substantial effect" within the United States).
69. Viet D. Dinh & Wendy J. Keefer, FISA and the PATRIOT Act: A Look Back
and a Look Forward, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. III (2006).
70. Dowling, supra note 12, at 287-288; see Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56; see also U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes
107th Congress - 1st Session, available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll call lists/roll call votecfm.cfm?congress=107&session=l&vote=00313 (listing
the United States Senate vote for the passage of the PATRIOT Act at ninety-eight yea
votes, one nay, and one abstention).
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nificantly expanded the definition of what constitutes a financial
institution for purposes of combating money laundering71 and has
conferred on district courts 'long-arm' jurisdiction12 over foreign
persons and financial institutions.7 3 Specifically, this is accom-
plished through Title III of the PATRIOT Act, the International
Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act
of 200111 that amends both the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act and the
1986 Anti-Money Laundering Act. 5
For instance, the PATRIOT Act enables the Secretary of the
Treasury to issue a summons or subpoena to "any foreign bank
that maintains a correspondent account in the United States and
request records related to such correspondent account, including
records maintained outside the United States relating to the
deposit of funds into the foreign bank."76 Although such subpoenas
were generally issued under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a) before the pas-
sage of the PATRIOT Act, when compliance with the subpoena or
summons ran afoul of foreign laws governing confidentiality, the
U.S. court, for reasons of comity, would typically defer to the for-
eign court.7 Now, however, U.S. courts will press forward and
financial institutions will be required to submit to the jurisdiction
which can exert the most pressure on the financial institution to
comply with their laws. 8
Financial institutions are also now required to maintain
"records of the information used to verify a person's identity,
including name, address, and other identifying information."79
While such information may seem trivial in nature, it helps U.S.
investigators in tracking the source of funds in order to combat
money laundering. For purposes of asset preservation trusts, this
information also becomes proof that a debtor has funds in an off-
shore account. Financial institutions are now also more willing to
provide this information to investigators because § 351 of the
PATRIOT Act amends the Bank Secrecy Act (1970) by providing
71. Ali, supra note 7, at 236.
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 869 (8th Ed. 2004) (defining 'long-arm jurisdiction'
as jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has had some contact with the
jurisdiction in which the petition was filed).
73. Ali, supra note 7, at 240.
74. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318 (West 2006).
75. Id.
76. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(k)(3)(A)(ii) (West 2006).
77. Guyote, supra note 44.
78. Mackinnon v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., (1986) 1 All E.R. 653
(Ch.) (U.K.).
79. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318()(2)(B) (West 2006).
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financial institutions with legal immunity from liability for volun-
tary disclosures of suspicious transactions. 80
B. Broadening Judicial Interpretation of Anti-Money
Laundering Laws
The enactment of new legislation combating money launder-
ing has also been accompanied by broadening judicial interpreta-
tion of these statutes. Money laundering was initially outlawed in
1986 to combat the illicit drug trade.8' Since then, however, courts
have interpreted 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 to encompass concealing the
"proceeds" of bankruptcy fraud in offshore accounts as well.82 As a
result of this interpretation, § 1956 is now made applicable to a
much broader number of asset preservation trusts. Other courts
have also expanded the definition of "intent" under § 1956 to
include "willful blindness." 3 Under such an interpretation, a law-
yer who establishes such a trust is now under a duty to investi-
gate the origins of money deposited therein in order to ensure that
the money was gained through legitimate means.
U.S. court decisions have also methodically targeted many of
the specific aspects of offshore asset preservation trusts which
make them desirable to customers. For instance, in United States
v. Bank of Nova Scotia,4 a landmark case, the 11th Circuit held
that the interest of American citizens in the privacy of their bank
records located offshore was substantially reduced when balanced
with the interest of their own government in a criminal investiga-
tion. 5 As a result of this decision, banks can now look at the rela-
tive interests of the different states involved in order to come to
the conclusion that America's interest in pursuing a criminal
investigation may outweigh any comparable interest a foreign
state might have in enforcing bank secrecy laws."
U.S. courts have also turned up the heat on the settlor of the
trust in order to collect more information regarding the trusts or
80. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(g)(3)(A) (West 2006).
81. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West 2006).
82. United States v. Castellini, 392 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that
bankruptcy fraud can produce "proceeds" under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956
83. United States v. Oberhauser, 284 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2002).
84. 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984) (concerning the enforceability of a district court's
subpoena for bank records held by the Cayman Island branch of a Canadian bank).
The Canadian bank protested that divulging the information would violate Cayman
Island bank secrecy laws, but the court of appeals nevertheless balanced the relative
interest of the States involved and required compliance. Id. at 828.
85. Id. at 827.
86. Id. at 829.
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attach the assets. Courts have held that a settlor can be held in
contempt of court and incarcerated for failing to cooperate with a
court order to turn over records regarding the trust.7 While a set-
tlor can typically claim that they have no power to comply with
such an order to produce bank records,8 in an offshore asset pres-
ervation trust such a claim is more tenuous because the settlor
retains substantial power over the trust.
In Eulich v. United States,9 for instance, the district court did
not buy the argument that the settlor had no control over his trust
when the IRS demanded documents relating to it. The court
ordered Eulich to produce documents concerning the trust by all
means possible, including filing a lawsuit in the Bahamas to facili-
tate production of the documents. 9° In Eulich, the court found that
to the extent that producing the documents was impossible for
Eulich, it was only because of the situation which Eulich himself
created by depositing between $75-$100 million dollars in a Baha-
mian asset preservation trust, and that Eulich should not be
allowed to benefit from the situation he had created. 1
In addition to attacking some of the specific features of off-
shore asset preservation trusts, U.S. courts have also expanded
the scope of what sort of trusts they are willing to consider illegiti-
mate. In Breitenstine v. Breitenstine,92 the Wyoming Supreme
Court evaluated a Bahamian asset preservation trust used by a
husband to shield assets from his wife before an impending
divorce proceeding. The Court concluded that such a use was "rep-
rehensible" and that the asset preservation trust was created to
hinder, delay, or defraud the husband's creditors.93
Such legally ambiguous uses raise broad public policy ques-
tions concerning offshore asset preservation trusts and lead some
to conclude that such trusts are fraudulent on their face.94 Others
argue, however, that they are merely another form of trust which
87. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, L.L.C., 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999); In
re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002).
88. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983) (where compliance is
impossible there is no need for a civil contempt order).
89. No. Civ.A.3:99CV1842-L, 2004 WL 1844821, *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2004).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 3.
92. 62 P.3d 587 (Wyo. 2003).
93. Id. at 592-593.
94. Flynn, supra note 9 (explaining that SunTrust and Bank of America have
refused to work with asset preservation trusts because of their legally ambiguous
underpinnings).
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affords the settlor more control,95 a feature that is not in itself
fraudulent. However one views such accounts, the United States
has led the way in pressuring offshore jurisdictions to adopt more
lenient bank secrecy laws, but they have also employed the help of
others along the way.
C. The International Fight Against Money
Laundering
Of course, the United States is not alone in its attempt to
stem the flow of illicit money into offshore jurisdictions. With
America leading the way, the United Nations has formed the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, which recognizes the need for cooperation among
States in devising and adopting effective measures for the preven-
tion of the financing of terrorism.96 The Convention calls upon its
signatory countries to take steps to prevent and counteract the
financing of terrorism through appropriate domestic measures as
well as through international cooperation.97 While an effective
means of fighting money laundering in theory, certain key off-
shore jurisdictions, including the Bahamas, have not yet ratified
the treaty.98
The G7, led by the United States, has also undertaken the
task of combating money laundering. In 1989 the G7 formed the
Financial Action Task Force (hereinafter "FATF") in order to rec-
ommend measures to improve countries' money laundering laws.99
The FATF issued forty recommendations"' that provide a guide to
countries in revising their legislation. In 2000, FATF issued a
report in which it identified "serious systematic problems" with
the anti-money laundering laws of five Caribbean nations includ-
95. Id.
96. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000), available at http://www.un.orgflaw/cod/finterr.htm
(last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
97. Alexander J. Urbelis, Rethinking Extraterritorial Prosecution in the War on
Terror: Examining the Unintentional Yet Foreseeable Consequences of Extra-
territoriality Criminalizing the Provision of Material Support to Terrorist and Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, 22 CONN. J. INT'L L. 313, 314 (2007).
98. Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr. & George Edward Sanders, The Effect of the USA
Patriot Act on the Money Laundering and Currency Transaction Laws, 4 RiIH. J.
GLOBAL L. & Bus. 47, 57 (2004).
99. Id. at 58-59.
100. Financial Action Task Force, The 40 Recommendations, http://www.fatf-gafi.
org/documentl28/0,3343,en_32250379_32236930_3365814011_1 1,00.html#40recs.
(stating both the original 40 recommendations of the FATF as well as 9 supplemental
recommendations concerning the fimding of terrorism).
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ing the Bahamas and Cayman Islands. 10' Although the FATF's
power to enforce these recommendations relies on engaging in dia-
logue with non-compliant nations and the embarrassment associ-
ated with being non-compliant, °2 the method seems to have
worked because Myanmar, the last country to be listed as non-
compliant by the FATF, has been removed from the list.103 How
effective these forty recommendations are at curtailing either the
legitimate or illegitimate usage of offshore asset preservation
trusts remains to be seen.04
IV. THE CARIBBEAN REACTION
Various Caribbean jurisdictions have responded to interna-
tional and unilateral U.S. pressure to fight money laundering
through a number of legislative enactments and judicial opinions.
While some legislative enactments have been viewed as positive
steps forward, others have had a limited effect on the operation of
asset preservation trusts. In like manner, various Caribbean judi-
ciaries have issued decisions both in an attempt to cooperate with
efforts to fight money laundering and in defense of their own
sovereignty.
A. Caribbean Legislative Response
The Caribbean legislative response to U.S. pressure to
address money laundering has differed from country to country,
but certain trends have become apparent. These trends include
the erosion of banking secrecy laws and the formulation of finan-
cial intelligence units to facilitate international cooperation, but
the overall preservation of the asset preservation trust's immu-
nity from foreign judgments.
In the Cayman Islands, for instance, the legislative assembly
has signed a 'Statement Regarding Drug Cooperation' °5 in
101. Jason Ennis, Cleaning up the Beaches: The Caribbean Response to the FATF's
Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories, 8 FALL L. & Bus. REV.
AM. 637, 638 (2002).
102. Financial Action Task Force, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries and
Territories 2006-2007 (Oct. 12, 2007), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/14/11/39552
632.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Todd Doyle, Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current
FATF Tactics Needlessly Violate International Law, 24 Hous. J. INT'L L. 279 (2002).
105. Statement Regarding Drug Cooperation Agreements and Extension Thereof
with United Kingdom of Behalf of the Cayman Islands, U.S.-U.K., Mar. 26, 1990,
State Dept. No. 90-121 [hereinafter Statement].
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response to Bank of Nova Scotia"6 and a subsequent 'exchange of
letters' among the United States, the Cayman Islands and United
Kingdom. 7 This agreement allows for Caymanian courts to com-
pel production of bank documents in specified drug cases.' The
agreement, however, is not made applicable to cases of either tax
evasion (which is not a crime in the Cayman Islands because there
are no income taxes) or when a debtor is attempting to shield
assets from a creditor. 9 As a result, many of the uses of the asset
preservation trust in the Cayman Islands remain unaltered and
creditors wishing to attack some of these more legally tenuous
uses of asset preservation trusts have been required to try the
case anew in the Cayman Islands.
The Cayman Islands has also formed the Cayman Island
Monetary Authority, which is charged with implementing the
country's anti-money laundering laws and providing assistance to
overseas regulatory authorities. 110 The primary money laundering
legislation the Monetary Authority is charged with upholding is
the Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Law (2007 Revision),"' which
covers all businesses and individuals. Like the Statement Regard-
ing Drug Cooperation, however, the Proceeds of Criminal Conduct
Law is limited in scope and only made applicable to "criminal con-
duct," which is defined as an indictable offense if it had occurred
in the Cayman Islands or conduct committed outside the jurisdic-
tion that would constitute an offense if it had been committed
within the Cayman Islands."' The scope of the Monetary Author-
ity therefore does not encompass U.S. laws unless those laws are
also laws of the Cayman Islands.
Similar to the Cayman Islands' Monetary Authority, the
Bahamas created the Financial Intelligence Unit in 2000 pursu-
ant to the Financial Intelligence Unit Act 2000"1 in response to
106. 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984).
107. Statement, supra note 105.
108. Id.
109. Ali, supra note 7, at 212.
110. Monetary Authority Law, Cayman Gazette No. 17 of 23rd, §5(1) (2004
Revision) (Cayman Is.), available at http://www.cimoney.com.ky/uploadedFiles/
RegulatoryFramework/Laws andRegulations/MAL2004.pdf (last visited Nov. 14,
2007).
111. Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Law (2007 Revision)(Cayman Is.), available at
http://www.cimoney.com.ky/uploadedFiles/Regulatory-Framework/Laws-and_
Regulations/ProceedsofCriminalConductLaw2007%20Revision.pdf. (last visited Nov.
14, 2007).
112. Id. at § 32(10).
113. No. 39 of 2000 (Bah.), available at http://www.bahamas.gov.bs/bahamasweb2/
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being blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force. Also like the
Cayman Island Monetary Authority, the Bahamas Financial
Intelligence Unit is mandated by law to cooperate with interna-
tional law enforcement agencies in order to stem the flow of money
laundering114 and as a result has won removal from the list of
countries regarded as noncompliant with the Financial Action
Task Force's list of forty recommendations." 5 Although the Baha-
mas have no tax treaties in force, their Financial Intelligence Unit
has also entered into mutual legal assistance treaties with other
nations which provide for the exchange of information and compli-
ance with specific foreign court orders."1 6 In the calendar year
2006, the Financial Intelligence Unit received sixty-six requests
for assistance from foreign financial investigatory units, eleven of
which were from the United States, and was able to provide assis-
tance or is providing assistance ninety-one percent of the time."7
These steps mark a positive step forward in the fight to combat
illegal money laundering without interrupting the operation of
legitimate offshore asset preservation trusts.
Not all recent laws, however, are being adopted for the pur-
pose of making it easier for foreign courts to enforce judgments
against assets in a foreign jurisdiction. It is relatively recently, for
instance, that the Bahamas have enacted a two-year statute of
limitations on the commencement of proceedings alleging a fraud-
ulent conveyance into a trust"8 and have placed the burden of
establishing the settlor's fraudulent intent on the creditor seeking
to set aside the transfer."9 Since the ordinary course of litigation
in the United States often takes years to begin with, many credi-
home.nsf/vContentW/CC-Other-Compliance+Commission+PDFS/$file/FinIntell
UnitAct2000(ConsolidatedVersion).pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
114. No. 39 of 2000, § 4(2)(c), § 4(2)(g) (Bah.), available at http://www.bahamas.gov.
bs/bahamasweb2/home.nsf/vContentW/CC-Other-Compliance+Commission+
PDFS/$file/FinIntellUnitAct2000(ConsolidatedVersion).pdf, at 3 (last visited Nov. 14,
2007) (Upon request by a foreign financial intelligence unit, the Bahamas Financial
Intelligence Unit may freeze a person's bank account for a period not exceeding five
days, compel production of documents the Unit considers relevant to the fulfillment of
its function, and provide the information to a foreign financial intelligence unit).
115. Ennis, supra note 101, at 650.
116. Financial Intelligence Unit, Ann. Rep. (2006), available at http://www.
bahamas.gov.bs/bahamasweb2/home.nsf/vContentW/FIU-Welcome+Page-FIU+
PDFs/$FILE/Annual%2OReport%202006.pdf. (last visited, Nov. 14, 2007).
117. Id. at 28-29.
118. The two years begins to run from the time of the conveyance into the trust, not
the initial court action.
119. Fraudulent Disposition Act of 1991, § 4 (Bah.), available at http://privatetrust
co.com/public/FDA.PDF (last visited, Nov. 14, 2007).
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tors may find that by the time they realize the assets they seek
are in a Bahamian asset preservation trust, it is too late to file
suit in the Bahamas.
The laws in St. Christopher and Nevis in like manner have
established a very high burden for establishing a fraudulent con-
veyance into a trust. The recently enacted 'Proceeds of Crime
Act"2 stipulates that, "It shall be a defense to a charge under this
section if the person satisfies the Court that he did not know or
had no reasonable grounds for knowing that the property referred
to in the charge was derived, directly or indirectly, from some form
of serious offence." 121 Nevis therefore takes a much stricter view of
what constitutes a fraudulent conveyance than do most U.S.
courts. For instance, the Eighth Circuit in Oberhauser held willful
ignorance was enough to establish intent for purposes of proving a
fraudulent conveyance. 12 2 Therefore, while a U.S. court may estab-
lish a fraudulent conveyance upon a finding of willful ignorance
and exert pressure on the settlor, a court in Nevis might hold that
the burden for establishing a fraudulent conveyance has not been
met and decline to enforce a U.S. court order to hand over assets
in the trust.
Nevertheless, St. Christopher and Nevis have also created a
Financial Intelligence Unit in order to enforce their anti-money
laundering laws through cooperation with foreign financial intelli-
gence units 23 and like their Caribbean compatriots, are no longer
listed as noncompliant regarding FATF's forty recommendations
because of their significant progress in strengthening their anti-
money laundering capabilities. 24
B. The Caribbean Judicial Response
Caribbean courts have been as varied as their legislatures in
responding to U.S. pressure to fight money laundering and the
financing of terrorism. For instance, the U.K. Privy Council,
which hears appeals from the Bahamian Supreme Court, has been
120. No. 16 of 2000 (Saint Christopher and Nevis), available at http://www.skb
financialservices.com/PDF%20DocumentsThe%20Proceeds%20of%20Crime%2OAct%
202000.pdf, (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
121. Id. at 10.
122. United States v. Oberhauser, 284 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 2002).
123. The Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 16 of 2000 (Saint Christopher and Nevis),
available at http://www.skbfinancialservices.com/PDF%20Documents/The%20
Proceeds%20of'o20Crime%20Act%202000.pdf, at 25, (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
124. Financial Action Task Force, Ann. Rep. (2006-2007), available at httpJ/www.
fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/46/1/39162982.pdf, at 15 (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
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generally supportive of new anti-money laundering legislation.
The Privy Council has upheld the constitutionality of newly
enacted legislation to combat money laundering in the face of
opposition by interest related to the trust industry in the Baha-
mas.'25 The Privy Council has also upheld the revocation of a trust
company's license in response to suspected money laundering.126
While this may represent only one company, it is also representa-
tive of the overall belief that the era of lax regulation is now over.
Another landmark case in asset preservation trust jurispru-
dence came in 1995 with the Bahamian case of Grupo Torras S.A.
v. Al Sabah.12' In Grupo Torras, it was alleged that Sheikh Fahad,
a member of the Kuwaiti royal family, had defrauded investors to
the tune of $450 million dollars and then hid the assets in a series
of asset preservation trusts in the Bahamas and Cayman
Islands. 2 ' Employing the Fraudulent Dispositions Act of 1991,129
the Bahamian Supreme Court granted a 'mareva' injunction
which froze the assets of one such trust, preventing the trust from
invoking a flee clause in order to move the assets to another juris-
diction. 30 In ascertaining the intent of Bahamian legislators, the
court reasoned:
"It seems to me that it is one thing to ascribe to the Parlia-
ment of the Bahamas ("Parliament") an intention to make
The Bahamas more attractive as a "tax haven" by encour-
aging the establishment in this jurisdiction of what are
referred to in some commercial circles as "asset protection
trusts" but it is quite a different matter to attribute to Par-
liament an intention of allowing the Bahamas position as a
legitimate tax haven to be used as a cover for fraudulent
activity which has little or nothing to do with the minimisa-
tion of taxes or the protection of honestly acquired assets
from the sometimes unreasonable demands placed on those
assets e.g., as a result of an award of damages against a
professional person."131
It is worth noting that the court reasserted in Grupo Torras its
belief that avoiding taxes and protecting against some forms of
liability were legitimate uses of such trusts and that is such cir-
125. Ingraham & Ors v. Gilton & Anor, [2006] UKPC 40 (24 July 2006) (Bah.).
126. Suisse Security Bank & Trust Ltd., v. Governor of the Central Bank of the
Bahamas, [2006] UKPC 11 (13 March 2006) (Bah.).
127. [1995] BHS No. 86 (Bah.).
128. Id. at § 10, 15.
129. Id. at § 35-36.
130. Id. at § 101.
131. Id. at § 45.
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cumstances the court would not comply with a foreign court order.
Crucial to the court's granting of an injunction in Grupo Torras,
however, was the finding that the trust was a 'sham' in that Sheik
Fahad, as both settlor and primary beneficiary of the trust,
exerted control over the trust in a manner inconsistent with even
a self-settled trust.132 While a settlor of a self-settled trust will typ-
ically be allowed to make investment decisions regarding the
trust, Sheik Fahad withdrew money from the trust in order to pay
for membership in a country club so that he could play golf, and
also used trust funds to invest in property in the Bahamas which
he ended up using as a residence. 33
Grupo Torras is significant not only because of the amount of
money involved in the trust, but also because it draws a line in the
sand, defining how much control a settlor can exercise over off-
shore asset preservation trusts. It also clearly illustrates that off-
shore jurisdictions such as the Bahamas are willing to identify
fraudulent conveyances into an asset preservation trust going for-
ward. While many of the more legitimate uses of asset preserva-
tion trusts remain unaffected, it is now much more difficult for a
money launderer to take advantage of some of the unique features
of an asset preservation trust in order to obscure the origins of
funds and evade creditors.
C. Inter-Regional Cooperation
While Caribbean legislators and judiciaries have worked
independently in response to U.S. and international pressure to
combat money laundering, they have produced a collaborative
effort as well. This effort is in part, due to the recognition that if
uniform standards are not maintained throughout the region,
some countries may seek to achieve an unfair advantage in their
trust legislation, which would work to the detriment of the overall
goal of fighting the illegitimate use of these offshore financial
centers. 134
At the forefront of this inter-regional effort is the Caribbean
Financial Action Task Force (hereinafter 'CFATF'), created as a
result of a 1990 meeting held in Aruba among member-states and
132. Id. at § 101.
133. Id. at § 57.
134. Permanent Secretary of SELA, Moneterrey Consensuses: Priorities and




the Kingston Declaration on Money Laundering.1"' The CFATF
has facilitated the signing of a memorandum of understanding
among their member states and they issue a yearly report in
which they track each other's progress in addressing money laun-
dering. Nations requesting to become "cooperating and supporting
nations" must express their commitment to the support of the
CFATF and undergo a positive mutual evaluation by the FATF or
a FATF-approved regional body. 3 '
The most recent report of the CFATF reports that the organi-
zation is "coming to grips with its role and purpose with greater
ease and responsibility"1"7 and notes several accomplishments. For
instance, all member states are now compliant with FATF's forty
recommendations and the CFATF has trained seventy-one exam-
iners during the past year on more stringent AML/CFT 18 stan-
dards for combating money laundering and the financing of
terrorism.'39 CAFTA has also proved useful in coordinating the
efforts of financial intelligence units of various Caribbean coun-
tries in what is now called the Heads of Financial Intelligence
Units Forum. 4 ° The 2006 Forum was attended by twenty-five
heads of state and provided a means by which different countries
could present the anti-money laundering approaches taken in
their respective jurisdictions. It also was attended by the U.S.
Department of Justice and Internal Revenue Service.'
Such collaboration between the Financial Intelligence Units
(hereinafter 'F.I.U.'s') of different countries has also been formal-
ized by the formulation of the Egmont Group. The Egmont group
facilitates the meeting of these various Financial Intelligence
135. Nov. 5-6, 1992, available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/
index.pdf.
136. Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Memorandum of Understanding
Among Member Governments of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, § 111(3)
Oct. 27, 2006, available at http://cfatf.org/eng/memo/index.pdf (last visited Sept. 11,
2008).
137. Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Annual Report, 4 Oct. 2005-Oct. 2006,
available at http://www.cfatf.org/documentation/getfile.asp?fileid=176&option= 1 (last
visited Nov. 14, 2007).
138. Financial Action Task Force, Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the
FATF 40 Recommendations and the FATF 9 Special Recommendations, available at
http://www.fatf-gafl.org/dataoecd/14/53/38336949.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2007)
(espousing a method of complying with FATF's forty Recommendations and nine
special recommendations regarding terrorism which are more stringent than the forty
recommendations alone).
139. Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, supra note 137.
140. Id. at 20.
141. Id.
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Units in order to foster cooperation between F.I.U.s, assist and
advise F.I.U.s under development, and to cooperate with repre-
sentatives of other government agencies and international organi-
zations in order to fight both money laundering and the financing
of terrorism. 142 Caribbean members of the Egmont group include:
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Ber-
muda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominican Repub-
lic, Netherland Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent & the
Grenadines. 141
Cooperative endeavors such as the Egmont group and CFATF
facilitate not only the exchange of information, but also of stan-
dards governing asset preservation trust. Going forward, it is
likely that the continuation of such cooperation, coupled with U.S.
pressure, is likely to result in more uniform standards governing
offshore asset preservation trusts throughout the Caribbean.
V. A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE
The Caribbean as a collective unit has clearly come a long
way since the United States first sought to fight money launder-
ing beyond its own shores. In the process, the offshore financial
industry has seen both the rise of the asset preservation trust in
order to meet the needs of debtors, and its modification as a
means of preventing fraudulent conveyances and other forms of
money laundering.
Although asset preservation trusts are still an effective
means of protecting legitimately earned assets from foreign credi-
tors, U.S. pressure has clearly led to an erosion of banking secrecy
laws and any sensible lawyer should keep several things in mind
before establishing and operating such trusts. First, a lawyer
should be at least partially aware of the source of funds which
enter an asset preservation trust. While willful ignorance is still
insufficient to establish a fraudulent conveyance in most offshore
jurisdictions, a lawyer in the U.S. can be held liable as facilitating
the fraudulent conveyance and be deemed a co-conspirator of the
fraud.' One proposed solution to this danger is to require a client
who wishes to open an asset preservation trust to sign a solvency
142. Egmont Group, Statement of Purpose of the Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence Units, Jun. 23, 2004 available at httpJ/www.egmontgroup.org/files/
libraryegmont docs/statementofpurpose.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
143. Egmont Group, Financial Intelligence Units of the World, July 2007, available
at http://www.egmontgroup.orgIlist-of fius.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
144. 284 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2002).
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affidavit, pledging that the client has no outstanding judgments
against him.145 By requiring such an affidavit, a lawyer may be
able to absolve himself of liability if a U.S. court later alleges that
he facilitated a fraudulent conveyance into an offshore trust.
Second, although a trust that allows the settlor a greater
degree of control can in many situations be beneficial, as a result
of cases such as Grupo Torras46 there is still a real danger that
such trusts can nevertheless be held shams and set aside. It is
therefore essential that in drafting the trust agreement, the pow-
ers of the settlor are clearly defined and that the settlor does not
exceed these powers in reality.
Lastly, although determining the situs of the asset preserva-
tion trust is still an important decision, as inter-regional coopera-
tion leads to more uniform standards, the finance industry is
approaching a more standardized version of the asset preserva-
tion trust, regardless of where the trust is located. While such a
trend obviously makes the job of a lawyer easier in determining
the situs of a trust, it is still too early to determine whether this
trend will also lead to a loss of some of the features which make
asset preservation trusts so desirable in the first place.
For the time being, however, asset preservation trusts are
now less likely to be used as a means of illegal money laundering
because of U.S. pressure, yet they still provide both the flexibility
and the protection needed in today's increasingly litigious society
for assets earned through legitimate means.
145. Marks, supra note 1, at 3.
146. [19951 BHS No. 86 (Bah.).
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